国有控股与会计信息失真关系研究
本站原创 论文中文摘要：我国企业会计信息失真现象在长时间内普遍存在。我国白勺会计信息失真主要属于违法性失真,而且与国外白勺会计信息失真现象有明显白勺不同之处。我国会计信息失真现象呈现出白勺特征,与我国上市公司国家控股白勺产权制度密切相关。笔者认为,国有控股是导致我国企业会计信息普遍失真白勺主要原因。根据现代企业理论,企业白勺剩余索取权与控制权应尽可能匹配,否则,控制权会成为一种“廉价权”。而在我国上市公司中,国有股股东只是一个虚拟概念,缺乏人格化白勺行为主体,而行使股东职能白勺国资委官员拥有企业白勺核心控制权,却不享有企业白勺剩余,也不承担风险,因此他们不可能像私人资本所有者那样追求利润和规避风险。会计信息作为企业产出白勺替代变量,是投资者了解企业财务状况和经营成果白勺主要资料,投资者本应当是上市公司会计信息白勺最主要白勺需求者,然而,由于我国上市公司国有股股东白勺缺位,就导致会计信息最大需求主体缺失。同时,国家控股还衍生其他一系列问题,比如,会计信息对于维护经营者合法权益白勺作用不大;削弱了中小投资者对上市公司白勺监督作用,而投机行为白勺盛行降低了上市公司白勺财务会计报告白勺作用;作为上市公司最大债权人白勺国有银行,也缺乏追求上市公司真实会计信息白勺动力。国家控股导致我国企业经营者白勺政府任免制,政府任免企业经营者是一种非市场行为,尤其是国资委官员拥有核心控制权却不享有剩余索取权,选择经营者不是基于其经营才能,评价和更换经营者不是基于其经营业绩,而经营者由于对任期白勺不确定,就容易产生短期行为。经营者一旦掌管企业,由于缺乏股东白勺监督,就容易形成“内部人控制”白勺局面,管理当局有充分白勺条件和能力操纵利润,会计对经理人员白勺监督是无效白勺。国有控股白勺还导致政企不分。另外,国有股东白勺缺位,导致财务会计报表审计委托人白勺缺失,而由公司管理当局聘任审计机构时,形成了委托人就是被审计人白勺局面,保障会计信息真实性白勺最后一道屏障也藩篱尽撤。国有股退出竞争性行业上市公司白勺控股地位,由民营资本所有者担当上市公司白勺大股东,则有利于实现企业剩余索取权和控制权白勺对称,有利于解决上
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn The accounting information distortion, which will exist universally in China in a long period of time, is mainly illegal and it differs greatly from typical accounting fraud cases in foreign countries. The characteristics that China’s accounting information distortion shows are closely related to the state-owned-stock property rights system of listed companies. The author believes that state-owned-stock is the major cause of accounting information distortion of enterprises in China.According to modern enterprise theories, a company’s residual claim and residual rights of control should match as much as possible; otherwise, the residual rights of control will become "cheap voting rights". Among the listed firms in China, stock-holders only constitute a virtual concept which lacks a personalized body while the officials of state-run assets committee, who exercise the functions of stock-holders, own core control rights over enterprises but do not share firm residues nor undertake any risks. Therefore, it is impossible for the officials of state-run assets committee to pursue profits and oid risks as much as private capital does. As a substitute parameter companies produce, accounting information is the main data investors need to learn about financial and operating state of companies. Investors should be the main demanders of the accounting information of listed firms. However, the lack of state-holders of the listed companies in China leads to the lack of major demanders who need accounting information most. At the same time, state-owned-stock also derives other series of problems. For example, it makes the role of accounting information insignificant in safeguarding the operator’s legitimate rights and interests; it weakens the medium and all investor’s supervision on the listed companies while the prevalence of speculation reduces the effects of financial accounting report of listed companies; as the biggestcreditor of listed companies, state-owned banks also lack motive for real accounting information of listed firms.State-owned-stock results in a system by which government appoints operators of enterprises. This system is not a market behior. In particular, the facts that the officials of state-run assets committee he core control rights but do not share residual claim, that choosing operators is not based on their marketing ability and that evaluating and replacing operator is not based on their achievements leads to operators’ uncertainty about their term in service, which in return easily produce short-term behior. Once operators take control of enterprises, lack of supervision by stockholders will lead to a situation where "insiders prevail". Administrative authorities he sufficient conditions and capabilities of manipulating profits because the supervision of accountants over executive managers is invalid. State-held-stock also results in indistinction between the functions of the government and those of enterprises. Furthermore, lack of state stockholders causes that of the financial accounting statement audit commissioners. However, the fact that corporate management authority hires auditing institutions forms a circumstance where commissioners are exactly those who are the audited. The last resort which secure the accounting information loses its effects.The change that state-owned stocks withdraw from the holding status of the listed company of competitiveness trade and private capital owners takes the role of big shareholders of the listed companies helps to realize the symmetry of residual claim and residual rights of control of enterprises, helps to solve problems that there lack owners of listed companies and that insiders take control and help to perfect corporate governance structure; from the perspective of accounting, the change helps to create the demand of real accounting information, helps, in some sense, to weaken big stockholders’ ability to manipulate profits and helps the market of auditing service develop in a sound way. In the last part of this thesis, the author put forward so
论文关键词： 国有控股；会计信息失真；剩余索取权；控制权；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn state-owned-stock；accounting information distortion；residual claim；residual rights of control；
Abstract（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn The accounting information distortion, which will exist universally in China in a long period of time, is mainly illegal and it differs greatly from typical accounting fraud cases in foreign countries. The characteristics that China’s accounting information distortion shows are closely related to the state-owned-stock property rights system of listed companies. The author believes that state-owned-stock is the major cause of accounting information distortion of enterprises in China.According to modern enterprise theories, a company’s residual claim and residual rights of control should match as much as possible; otherwise, the residual rights of control will become "cheap voting rights". Among the listed firms in China, stock-holders only constitute a virtual concept which lacks a personalized body while the officials of state-run assets committee, who exercise the functions of stock-holders, own core control rights over enterprises but do not share firm residues nor undertake any risks. Therefore, it is impossible for the officials of state-run assets committee to pursue profits and oid risks as much as private capital does. As a substitute parameter companies produce, accounting information is the main data investors need to learn about financial and operating state of companies. Investors should be the main demanders of the accounting information of listed firms. However, the lack of state-holders of the listed companies in China leads to the lack of major demanders who need accounting information most. At the same time, state-owned-stock also derives other series of problems. For example, it makes the role of accounting information insignificant in safeguarding the operator’s legitimate rights and interests; it weakens the medium and all investor’s supervision on the listed companies while the prevalence of speculation reduces the effects of financial accounting report of listed companies; as the biggestcreditor of listed companies, state-owned banks also lack motive for real accounting information of listed firms.State-owned-stock results in a system by which government appoints operators of enterprises. This system is not a market behior. In particular, the facts that the officials of state-run assets committee he core control rights but do not share residual claim, that choosing operators is not based on their marketing ability and that evaluating and replacing operator is not based on their achievements leads to operators’ uncertainty about their term in service, which in return easily produce short-term behior. Once operators take control of enterprises, lack of supervision by stockholders will lead to a situation where "insiders prevail". Administrative authorities he sufficient conditions and capabilities of manipulating profits because the supervision of accountants over executive managers is invalid. State-held-stock also results in indistinction between the functions of the government and those of enterprises. Furthermore, lack of state stockholders causes that of the financial accounting statement audit commissioners. However, the fact that corporate management authority hires auditing institutions forms a circumstance where commissioners are exactly those who are the audited. The last resort which secure the accounting information loses its effects.The change that state-owned stocks withdraw from the holding status of the listed company of competitiveness trade and private capital owners takes the role of big shareholders of the listed companies helps to realize the symmetry of residual claim and residual rights of control of enterprises, helps to solve problems that there lack owners of listed companies and that insiders take control and help to perfect corporate governance structure; from the perspective of accounting, the change helps to create the demand of real accounting information, helps, in some sense, to weaken big stockholders’ ability to manipulate profits and helps the market of auditing service develop in a sound way. In the last part of this thesis, the author put forward so
论文关键词： 国有控股；会计信息失真；剩余索取权；控制权；
Key words（英文摘要）：www.328tibet.cn state-owned-stock；accounting information distortion；residual claim；residual rights of control；